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Intentional Electromagnetic Interference Effects in Cyber-
Physical Systems
J F Dawson:
Department of Electronics, University of York
ABSTRACT
This paper gives an overview of the possible effects of
Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) on
Cyber-Physical systems. Examples of a range of
attacks and possible countermeasures are presented.
INTRODUCTION
A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a system of
collaborating computational elements controlling
physical entities [1]. We are experiencing a world
where much of our everyday life is becoming
dependent on cyber-physical systems. Examples extend
from home appliances, to transport, factories, and the
utility infrastructure which supplies water, power, etc.
The possible use of Intentional Electromagnetic
Interference (IEMI) to disrupt critical systems is
becoming a significant concern [2]. A failure due to
IEMI may be blamed on faulty hardware or software,
and much time and money may be wasted on searching
for the cause, particularly if the failure is intermittent.
It is also possible that false information can be injected
into systems causing erroneous operation which may
not be detected until sometime later.
This paper outlines possible intentional interference
mechanisms and provides some examples of attacks on
specific systems and countermeasures that can be
applied.
INTERFERENCE WITH COMMUNICATION,
RADAR, AND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Radio communications, radar, and navigation systems
rely on the propagation of electromagnetic waves
which have a low amplitude at the receive antenna due
to attenuation in the propagation path and the practical
limits to transmit power. It is therefore possible to
interfere with the information transmitted by: jamming
to prevent the communications; or by injecting false
information (spoofing). Fields of sufficient intensity
can also cause permanent damage to the sensitive
receiver front-end.
We are increasingly relying on wireless connectivity
for systems ranging from sensor networks in the
internet of things (IoT), machine-to-machine (M2M)
communications in factories, warehouses, and in
critical infrastructure. Aircraft, shipping, and
autonomous vehicles of all kind rely on radar,
navigations systems, and communication system. All
of these are vulnerable to intentional electromagnetic
interference. A best interference may cause some
inconvenience, at worst it could cause serious failures
resulting in economic losses, death and injury.
Jamming and spoofing are two common interference
types. Jamming can be achieved with simple, low
power equipment. If the source can be placed near the
receiver, it can be of a much lower power output than
the original transmitter. Jamming is therefore difficult
to prevent, though potentially easy to detect. Spoofing,
replacing an authentic signal with a false one, requires
more sophisticated equipment than jamming but has
the potential to cause much greater problems as false
data can be fed into a system. Detection of spoofing is
possible using cryptographic methods to protect and
identify valid data.
Jamming and spoofing examples
Figure 1. Compact mobile phone jammer2
(image from [3])
GSM-R
GSM-R is part of the European Train Management
System (ERTMS) [4]. GSM-R is an adaptation of the
GSM mobile telephone system standard to provide data
and voice communications to trains. As some of the
data is safety critical, the train must stop if the GSM-R
connection is lost [5]. Compact battery powered
Jammers can be purchased online for GSM systems
and it is likely they can be successfully operated from
within the train [6]. One mitigation for such attacks is
the successful detection of the attack which can be
achieved with a suitable channel monitoring system
such as described in [7].
Radar
The jamming of radar systems has been used in
electronic warfare almost since the invention of radar
[8]. As well as their use for aircraft and shipping
navigation and collision avoidance, radar systems are
becoming more widely used in road vehicle safety
systems and for autonomous vehicles.
GPS
GPS signals are very low level and easy to jam. It has
been reported that criminals use GPS jammers to defeat
vehicle tracking systems to enable the theft and
hijacking of vehicles and their loads [9]. Feeding false
information to (spoofing) a GPS system has been
demonstrated on a number of occasions [10], [11].
With the increasing reliance on GPS for navigation in
manned and unmanned vehicles, GPS spoofing opens
many possibilities for hijacking and misdirecting a
vehicle. Countermeasures which include the use of
local sensors [12] and message authentication [13] are
in development.
Wifi, M2M and other wireless data systems
In homes and offices we increasingly rely on wifi to
allow mobile devices, smart TVs, security systems, and
other household devices to communicate. In industry
and commerce, machine to machine communications
and sensor networks are increasingly used in daily
operations. Whilst most of these systems can be
reasonably robust against spoofing if suitable security
measures are taken [14] there seem to exist a number of
attacks which allow weak passwords to be cracked
[15]. Recent hacking of connected vehicles has shown
that many functions including engine and braking can
be remotely controlled [16].
INTERFERENCE WITH ELECTRONIC
SYSTEMS
Electronic systems in the UK undergo a degree of
testing to meet the requirements of the EU Directive on
Electromagnetic Compatibility [17] and are tested to
standards which require them to have a degree of
immunity to radiated and conducted electromagnetic
interference. Typically, EMC standards require
radiated immunity levels of a few volts per meter for
electronic devices. This was intended to protect them
from the fields generated by nearby wireless devices.
Similarly, some immunity to conducted interference
including electrostatic discharge and fast transient burst
is required by EMC standards. These are again
intended to ensure that the equipment operates
successfully in a normal electromagnetic environment.
Currently portable electromagnetic weapons are readily
available that are capable of radiating electric fields of
tens to hundreds of kilovolts per metre at distances of a
few metres to a few tens of metres [18], [19]. Similar
pulse generators may be used to couple energy to
power or signal cables that may be accessible.
IEMI Effects on electronic circuits
Interfering signals coupled into electronic circuits can
cause a number of effects.
Demodulation
At low levels radio frequency interference signals,
above the normal operating frequency range of the
circuit can be demodulated by the non-linear elements
in the circuit to produce a baseband signal which will
interfere with any wanted signal (see Figure 2). Such
behaviour will cause incorrect analogue voltage levels.
Whilst digital circuits may be more immune to this
type of experience it may still cause bit errors and jitter
in signal timing resulting in incorrect operation of
clocked circuits [20].
Figure 2. Output of an op-amp (top) when a
10MHz modulated sinusoidal signal (bottom) is
injected into the inverting input .
Direct interference
Interfering signals within the passband of an electronic
circuit will add directly to the existing signals and may
affect the operation of circuits in a similar manner to
demodulated signals.
Figure 3. IEMI Damage resulting in the
destruction of a surface mount capacitor (Image
courtesy of Metatech Corp).
Damage
As the amount of energy entering the system due to
interference increases, there will eventually be enough
heating of components to cause thermal damage, the
effect is dependent upon pulse duration and magnitude
and the size of the component where the energy is
dissipated [21]. Figure 3. and Figure 4. Show examples
of damage to a capacitor and an IC due to IEMI.
Figure 4. IEMI Damage resulting in the
destruction of an IC (Image courtesy of Metatech
Corp)
Examples of IEMI effects
A wide range of examples of EMC problems is given
in the “Banana skins” series [22]. Some specific
examples of Intentional electromagnetic interference
are given, but many of the accidental cases could also
be triggered by intentional interference. Sabath [23]
describes a number of documented IEMI attacks on
gaming machines, security systems, communications
systems, and IT systems.
Immunity of IT systems
The susceptibility of Personal computers to EMI has
been tested by a number of investigators. Hoad, Carter
and Watkins [24] examined a number of computers
under pulsed CW (30µs pulse with a prf of 1 kHz)
interference in a reverberation chamber. When the
“upset threshold” was measured All of the computers
tested showed an increase in immunity with frequency
and the more recent models (Pentium 4 processor)
showed a better immunity than older (486 processor).
The older (486) PCs experienced upsets at 90 V/m at
400 MHz rising to 2 kV/m at 8 GHz, whereas for the
Pentium based models the upset levels were 500 V/m
and 6 kV/m at the same frequencies. Whilst no
definitive reason is given for the differences, it is
suggested that with the advent of the EU directive on
EMC, and increased processor speeds the
manufacturers had to increase the shielding
effectiveness of the case and pay more attention to the
PCB layouts in order to ensure the radiated emissions
standards were met. This also resulted in increased
immunity. As ICs get faster with smaller transistors
one might expect their susceptibility would decrease
and the frequencies at which they are susceptible to
increase. We have also observed that susceptibility
tends to decrease with frequency in analogue ICs [25]
until enough energy is injected to do physical damage.
Camp, and Garbe [26] tested the susceptibility of PC
motherboards with no shielding to short pulse
interference which showed that newer generations of
motherboard were more susceptible to the pulsed
interference than older generations. With 2.5 ns pulses
they found that 486 based motherboards had a failure
threshold of about 12 kV/m whereas a Pentium 3 based
motherboard has a failure threshold of about 3 kV/m.
Note that these fields are higher than some of the CW
fields used by Hoad et al [24] even without the effect
of case shielding. Short pulses need a higher amplitude
to have an effect than CW waveforms or longer pulses
[21]. Nitch et al [27] show similar effects and levels for
a range of digital devices.
Kreitlow, Sabath, and Garbe [28] recently investigated
the effects of IEMI pulsed sources on a small office IT
network using a Diehl suitcase generator [29] which
produces a damped sinusoidal waveform. In this
scenario pickup on network cabling was expected to be
a significant effect and with test fields of 5 kV/m
induced common mode currents of 5 A were observed
on the network cables. Whilst the interference was
observed to cause some reduction of data transmission
rates in the network, this was ameliorated by the
network protocols and no upset to the system as a
whole occurred. Brauer [30] applied short pulse
(44 kV/m), damped sinusoidal (60 kV/m) and pulsed
sinusoidal (70 kV/m) sources to network equipment
and observed substantial reductions in network
performance. The IEEE standard 1642-2015 [31]
provides a recommended practice for IT equipment.
Whilst IT systems are often thought of in the office
environment it must be remembered that they also
make up the infrastructure which controls our factories,
banks, power stations, and other critical infrastructure.
Radasky and Savage describe effects of conducted and
radiated interference on electric power systems in [32].
Parfenov et al [33] have shown that equipment power
supplies are vulnerable to conducted transients which
can propagate some distance on power lines in a range
of scenarios.
Immunity of road vehicles
Most modern road vehicles rely on electronic engine
management systems and these are vulnerable to IEMI.
A commercial system is available to stop road vehicles
using IEMI [34].
CONCLUSIONS
A brief review of the effects of IEMI on electronic
systems, taken from the literature, has been presented
which illustrate some of the possible effects. It can be
seen from the examples that whilst many modern
systems exhibit quite high levels of immunity, well
above that required by EMC standards, IEMI sources
are available that my cause temporary or permanent
failures and this should be considered as a risk in the
design of any critical systems. Radio, radar and GPS
systems are particularly sensitive to low powered
interference sources though some countermeasures are
available to detect interference or spoofing.
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